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ABSTRACT 
We present the results of an internet-based contingent choice survey about 
management options at North Cascades National Park, focusing on 
respondent consistency. A tournament-style contingent ranking design 
followed by a contingent rating exercise allows for tests of different kinds 
of consistency in survey responses. Many respondents give inconsistent 
responses, but these inconsistencies do not create large differences in 
estimated tradeoffs between scenario attributes. 
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Introduction 
Contingent ranking experiments are known to suffer from violations in the underlying 
axioms of utility theory. Their validity presupposes that respondents have fully-formed 
preferences and are fully able to transform those preferences to the setting of a complex survey 
instrument. They further assume that respondents do not introduce bias, neither wittingly nor 
unwittingly, into their stated outcomes. Existing literature demonstrates that these assumptions 
are frequently invalid, especially in the context of non-marketable goods, where respondents may 
be unfamiliar with pricing and appropriating trade-offs.  
Various forms of violation to these underlying axioms suggest that preferences are not 
fully-formed or that respondents are less able to elicit them the deeper or more complex the 
rankings task. Sequencing effects – learning and fatigue – are phenomena that violate both areas. 
Respondents suffering from learning effects display a shift in preferences from their starting 
point over the course of the survey, suggesting their preferences are not fully-formed. 
Conversely, fatigue effects –whereby respondents’ rankings become noisier as the survey 
progresses – suggest that respondents may have fully-formed preferences but are unable to 
sustain their elicitation. [Ben-Akiva et al; Chapman and Staelin; Hausman and Ruud] 
Bias may be introduced by the instrument as well. Status quo bias results when 
respondents find the status quo scenario either systemically less or more preferable modulo the 
difference in attributes. It may be introduced just by the labeling of the scenario as such [ref] and 
has been found to bias results in either direction [Samuelson and Zeckhauser; Ben-Akiva et al; 
Foster and Mauroto]. Increased noise may result from respondents being indifferent between 
scenarios but forced to place an order on them if ties in ranking are not permitted [ref]. 
Complexity in various forms also increases the likelihood of non-logical responses, from the 
number of attributes and levels to the within-scenario variation in them [DeShazo and Fermo 
2002]. 
Finally, contingent ranking experiments are frequently found to display differences in 
both efficiency and economic outcomes across ranks [ref]. Therefore violation of theory may 
differ based on the level of ranking or respondents may be displaying indifference between less 
preferred options. 
This study introduces a novel survey design that aims to obviate some of the issues found 
in previous contingent ranking studies while simultaneously permitting a number of tests for 
logical fallacy. The next section introduces the survey; a section follows discussing the design; 
the following section presents results from a range of construct validity testing; and finally we 
present an econometric analysis. 
North Cascades National Park Survey 
 The North Cascades Park General Management Plan (National Park Service 1988) 
identifies five attributes as the most relevant to park management and resource allocation: 
cultural preservation, wilderness preservation, threatened and endangered species protection, 
water quality, and visitation. Scenarios for the contingent choice survey were therefore 
constructed with these five attributes plus a compulsory, one-time tax change, included as an 
implicit cost mechanism. The varying levels of the attributes, shown in Figure 1, correspond to 
the current situation in the park and to plausible alternatives based on the management plan. 
Scenarios were constructed in a fractional factorial orthogonal matrix, with 47 remaining once 
clearly sub-optimal scenarios were removed. Each scenario represents a hypothetical description 
of the state of the park in five years. 
Figure 1 
Scenario Attributes and Their Levels 
Attribute Level (from lowest to highest) 
Cultural 
Preservation 
60 (9% fewer) 
structures in good 
condition 
66 (no change in) 
structures in good 
condition 
72 (9% more) 
structures in good 
condition 
80 (21% more) 
structures in good 
condition 
Wilderness 
Preservation 
60 acres disturbed 
and 963 acres 
unrestored (8% less 
restoration) 
56 acres disturbed 
and 900 acres 
unrestored (no 
further restoration) 
50 acres disturbed 
and 801 acres 
unrestored (12% 
more restoration) 
45 acres disturbed 
and 720 acres 
unrestored (25% 
more restoration) 
Threatened and 
Endangered 
Species Protection 
No species protected 
and stable 
Bald eagle protected 
and stable (status 
quo) 
Bald eagle and 
grizzly bear 
protected and stable 
Bald eagle, grizzly 
bear, and two other 
species protected and 
stable 
Water Quality 65% unimpaired 
(10% less 
restoration) 
75% unimpaired (no 
further restoration) 
80% unimpaired (5% 
more restoration) 
90% unimpaired 
(15% more 
restoration) 
Visitation 390,000 (10% 
decrease) 
430,000 (no change) 475,000 (10% 
increase) 
530,000 (23% 
increase) 
Tax $20 decrease; no change; $20, $40, $55, $75, $100 increase 
 
 Increases in cultural preservation, wilderness preservation, species protection, and water 
quality are expected to increase utility and thus the likelihood of a higher ranking, all else equal. 
An increase in tax is expected to have the opposite effect, ceteris paribus. A priori, the sign on 
visitation is unknown, since more visitation probably leads to more congestion, which might be 
thought of as deleterious even for those with only nonuse values, but on the other hand 
respondents might believe there are positive spillover effects of others’ visits to society at large 
(Turner 2002). 
 After respondents went through several informational web pages related to each attribute, 
an analysis of current park resource allocation, and a brief explanation of each attribute’s levels, 
they were presented with several mandatory framing exercises before the contingent choice 
section. These served as a warm-up to the contingent choice task and also led respondents to 
consider basic tradeoffs between attributes. In line with the literature, they were also designed to 
force respondents to think about competing substitute public goods and their own budget 
constraints. This should help reduce hypothetical bias, though some authors argue that these 
lead-in questions have little effect on responses (Loomis et al. 1994, Kotchen and Reiling 1999, 
Whitehead and Blomquist 1999; Loomis et al. also have an interesting exchange with Whitehead 
and Blomquist in the November 1995 issue of Land Economics).  
 The survey was designed and pre-tested in stages from 2004 to the fall of 2005. In the 
spring of 2006 emails with a link to the survey’s website were sent to a random collection of 
individuals in the U.S. 240 respondents gave answers to the contingent choice questions, though 
not all ranked every scenario group.  
Contingent Ranking Design 
We introduce a novel survey design that aims to obviate some of the issues found in 
previous contingent ranking studies while simultaneously permitting a number of tests for logical 
fallacy. Using a web-based instrument and with the assistance of a computer programmer, we 
employ a “tournament-style” format, where, starting from a pool of eight randomly allocated 
scenarios, favored alternate scenarios are sequentially ranked against each other and the status 
quo until a most-preferred scenario is revealed. In addition, respondents are asked to rate their 
last set of scenarios immediately following the rankings exercise and before a final round of 
post-survey and demographics questions. (Throughout the paper we use the terms “set” and 
“page” interchangeably.) The primary motivations of this design are two-fold: Firstly, by 
focusing respondents on their most-preferred alternate scenarios it should increase the precision 
of parameter estimates and reduce disparities across ranks; secondly, because of the high degree 
of repetition it permits a range of construct validity testing.1
The tournament format is illustrated in Figure 2. In the first round of ranking exercises, 
each respondent ranked four sets of scenarios, three at a time. In the second round the higher-
ranking alternative scenarios from the first two sets were pitted against each other and the status 
quo; similarly, another set of scenarios to rank was formed from the status quo and the higher-
ranking alternative scenarios from the third and fourth original sets. Finally, the higher-ranking 
alternative scenarios from the two sets of scenarios in the second round were grouped with the 
status quo for a third round consisting of one last ranking exercise. This was followed by a rating 
exercise on the same set of three scenarios. 
Figure 2 
Illustration of Tournament Format and Implied Orderings 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 
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SQ: Status Quo 
Higher-ranked alternative scenarios in bold face 
Implied rankings in parentheses 
 
From the design we identify three broad categories of consistency tests: ranking, rating, 
and transitivity.2 A scenario is said to be rank inconsistent if its ranking relative to the status quo 
                                                           
1 We also investigate whether extrapolating implied orderings increases efficiency and test for difference between 
the contingent ranking and rating models, though not discussed in this draft. 
changes between rounds. That is, if scenario 3 in the example were ranked higher than the status 
quo in round 1 but lower than the status quo in round 2, it fails its one test for rank inconsistency; 
the top two most preferred scenarios receive two tests for rank consistency. They further receive 
an additional test for rating consistency, which is applied in the same way as rank consistency by 
observing the underlying rankings. Note, however, that the exact same three scenarios – those 
already revealed to be their two most-preferred – are being immediately repeated, so respondents 
should have little difficulty in the underlying rankings task according to theory. 
 Finally, tests for transitivity are possible when the status quo is alternately ranked first 
and less-than-first in successive round-pairings; in the example, if 1 > SQ > 2 then SQ > 3 > 4. In 
these a full ordering for the next round is already implied, so a further test that the observed 
order matches the implied order was performed when testing for transitivity. A respondent fails 
transitivity if the expected order of the two alternate scenarios is not matched by observation. In 
the example, the respondent would pass the transitivity test if 1 > 3 and the full order test if 1 > 
SQ > 3 – that is, the respondent passed both rank and transitivity testing. 
Test Results 
Table 1 presents an overview of the results. Just over half of respondents were ever rank 
inconsistent while one in five tests failed. This is roughly in line with Foster and Maurato (2002) 
who also found about half of respondents occasionally failing and a third of the tests failing 
overall in a similar study. Even at a lower ratio there were a surprising number of failures in the 
ratings category and one in five respondents failed at least once.  
                                                                                                                                                                                               
2 Because a few clearly sub‐optimal scenarios were removed after generating an orthogonal set, dominance testing 
was not possible. 
There were 127 tests for transitivity out of a possible total of 618 round-2-or-3 ranking 
sets where 45% of the sample (92 respondents) had at least one test for transitivity.3 Of these, 
one in four respondents tested had at least one failure and one in five tests failed. Foster and 
Maurato (2002) observed 13% of their sample failing transitivity tests but a majority of non-
testing in our survey precludes a straightforward comparison. Additionally, there was a much 
higher rate of failure of rank consistency when transitivity was tested for, with over one half of 
both subjects and tests failing full-order consistency when observable. 
Table 1 - Incidence of Test Failures 
Test Tests Failure Test % Sample Failure Sample % 
Rank 1236 238 19% 206 115 56% 
Transitivity 127 27 21% 92 23 25% 
Full-Order 127 68 54% 92 52 57% 
Rate Consistency 412 58 14% 206 46 22% 
All (Rank or Rate)       206 123 60% 
Sample failures include respondents failing at least one test. 
Table 2 breaks down the frequency distributions of each broad category of test failure. 
The shapes reflect Foster and Mourato (2002) and in both surveys the modal number of failures 
is once for each test. 
Table 2 - Frequencies of Test Failures 
Test 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Rank 91 45 35 22 9 3 1 
Transitivity 69 19 4 0 -- -- -- 
Full-Order 40 38 12 2 -- -- -- 
Rate 160 34 12 -- -- -- -- 
 
                                                           
3 The status quo was ranked first 26% of the time in the first two rounds. 62 respondents (30%) had one transitivity 
test, 25 (12%) had two tests, and 5 (2%) had 3 tests. 
Because tests for ranking and rating are primarily against the status quo, perhaps 
consistent respondents are simply faced with an easier task if they either totally prefer or totally 
dislike the status quo. From the design, one would expect that the number of top rankings (1) 
declines and the number of lowest rankings (3) increases as the rounds progressed and 
respondents honed in to their alternate scenarios of choice. Then together with the former 
observation, respondents who rank the status quo last most of the time will, independent of other 
factors, be observed with a higher rate of consistency. Figure 3 shows the different distributions 
of status quo rankings across rounds by consistent and inconsistent respondents and reveals just 
this. 
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Table 3 tabulates status quo rankings by their lags and further clarifies the relationship of 
status quo movement with consistency. First, note the volume of passing tests tilts far to the end 
of low lagged status-quo rankings being preserved as low. Second, the failure rate of last-ranked 
lagged status quo is much smaller than higher lagged ranks due to the decreasing ambiguity of 
preferred scenarios to the status quo. 
Table 3 - Patterns of Status Quo Ranking by Test Failure 
  Lagged by Current Status Quo Ranking 
 1 2 3 
 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 1 2 3 Total 
Pass 169 75  244   97 223 320  58 376 434 
Fail  24 55 79 30 63  93 25 41  66 
Failure Rate       24%       23%       13% 
Total 169 99 55 323 30 160 223 413 25 99 376 500 
 
Rank Inconsistency Patterns 
To investigate the role of sequencing effects, we next break down inconsistencies into 
four distinct categories of rank consistency tests permitted by the three-tiered tournament design. 
Final round scenarios ranked differently relative to the status quo than the first two rounds we 
call fatigue failures because of this last-minute change in preference of a highly-ranked scenario. 
The two other cases of final round inconsistency – rounds 2 and 3 disagreeing with round 1, 
round 2 disagreeing with rounds 1 and 3 – which we refer to as shift and noise, respectively. 
Finally, we label the remaining category of test failure round2-losing, where the “losing” 
scenario in the second round has a change in preference relative to the status quo, to denote a 
distinction in sequence from the other three.4
Table 4 presents the results of these sequencing tests. Of all respondents, 41% were ever 
round2-losing, 20% were ever fatigued, 13 % ever shifted their preference and 11% ever gave 
noisy rankings. These add up to well over the number of respondents who were ever 
inconsistent, suggesting considerable overlap. Indeed over half of ever round2-losing 
                                                           
4 It should be noted that these labels do not necessarily connote a precise interpretation of the behavior of 
inconsistency. It is entirely possible that the same behavior psychology is manifested across different categories. 
respondents also failed another test. In total 38% of respondents at some point had trouble 
ranking even their two most preferred scenarios. 
The distribution of inconsistent patterns suggest round2-indifference and fatigue were the 
primary causes of inconsistency in the survey. Round2-losing can only be tested in the second 
round and it accounts for 68% of all test failures in that round (with shift and noise sharing the 
rest). Fatigue explains two-thirds of round3-failing scenarios (the noise category making up the 
rest). Ratings failures can also be thought of as a fatigue test since respondents are implicitly re-
ranking their two most-preferred scenarios immediately after ranking them explicitly. Recall that 
22% of respondents failed at least one such ratings test. Including these failures to the fatigue 
category now has 31% of all respondents and half of all inconsistent respondents. It therefore 
appears that most fallacies are a manifest of a change of preference or not being able to express 
indifference between less-preferred scenarios and the status quo, and fatigue for most-preferred 
scenarios.5
Incidence of Test Failures 
 Tests Failure Test % Sample Failure Sample % 
Rank 1236 238 19% 206 115 56% 
Round 3 Tests       
Shift 412 28 7% 206 26 13% 
Noise 412 25 6% 206 23 11% 
Fatigue 412 47 11% 206 42 20% 
S+N+F 412 100 24% 206 91 44% 
Round 2 Test       
Round2-Losing 412 113 27% 206 85 41% 
Round2-Losing-Only    206 37 18% 
S+N+F-Only   206 78 38% 
Sample failures include respondents failing at least one test. The S+N+F category includes all three round-3 test 
failures. 
                                                           
5 The inability to express ranking ties is a condition of the tournament instrument, although one could permit 
respondents to tie so long as they don’t occur between the two alternate scenarios. 
In combination with the sequence of test failures we also look at the direction of change 
relative to the status quo in Table 5, which yields an interesting fact: inconsistencies were twice 
as likely to be the result of a decrease in the relative ranking of “losing” alternate scenarios. 
Fatigue and round2-failures overwhelmingly resulted from lower rankings relative to the status 
quo from the previous round, while preference-shift failures were more likely to yield higher 
rankings. This combined with the fact that respondents were more likely to be consistent when 
giving the status quo low ranks shows that inconsistent respondents are shifting their preferences 
downwards, while consistent respondents will appear to shift theirs upward because their favorite 
scenarios are consistently being repeated in the experiment. If respondents are willing to pay for 
changes to the survey attributes one would therefore expect a magnitude of difference between 
consistent and inconsistent respondents. 
Table 5 - Change in Relative Ranking to the Status Quo 
 Round 2 Round 3 Outcome 
 higher lower % lower higher lower % lower win lose % lose 
Rank 54 112 67% 25 47 65% 74 164 69% 
Round2-Losing 26 87 77% -- -- -- 0 113 100% 
Shift 18 10 36% -- -- -- 14 14 50% 
Noise 10 15 60% 15 10 40% 12 13 52% 
Fatigue -- -- -- 10 37 79% 8 39 83% 
Outcomes pertain to the round(s) of the test: Rank is both rounds 2 and 3, Round2-Losing is round 2, and Shift, 
Noise, and Fatigue are round 3. 
 
Econometric Analysis 
 The contingent ranking method has been used to value a variety of environmental goods 
(for example Beggs et al., 1981; Lareau and Rae, 1989; Garrod and Willis, 1997; Caplan, et al. 
2002. Most researchers use a rank-ordered logit model; we briefly summarize the underlying 
theory here. First, utility Uij  (where i indexes the :individual and j the scenario) is assumed to be 
divided into a measurable component Vij and a random component eij which is assumed to be 
independent and identically distributed with a type 1 extreme value distribution. Rankings 
indicate relative utility levels for a respondent, for example U11 > U1  > U13. V is an indirect 
utility function with each park attribute ( , 1, ,5ka k = … ) plus cost (c; the tax attribute here) as 
arguments. An alternative-specific constant (ASC) representing the status quo scenario is often 
added. Personal characteristics can be added using interaction terms. For the simple, attributes-
only case, the probability of a particular complete ordering of a group of scenarios for individual 
i is 
( ) 1 2
1 3 12 2
5
1 2 3 6
1
 where 
i i
i i i
V V
i i i ij j k jkV V VV V
k
e eP U U U V ASC a c
e e e e e =
> > = ⋅ = + β +β+ + + ∑ j . (1) 
 Increases in cultural preservation, wilderness preservation, species protection, and water 
quality are expected to increase utility and thus the likelihood of a higher ranking, all else equal, 
so their β s should be positive. An increase in tax is expected to have the opposite effect, ceteris 
paribus, so  should be negative. A priori, the sign on visitation is unknown, since more 
visitation probably leads to more congestion, which might be thought of as deleterious even for 
those with only nonuse values, but on the other hand respondents might believe there are positive 
spillover effects of others’ visits to society at large (Turner 2002). 
6β
Equation (1) assumes that each ranking of three scenarios is independent. Each 
respondent generates multiple sets of rankings, so some might question this assumption. It is 
consistent, though, with the simple, attributes-only case we are using here which assumes that 
respondent characteristics do not affect utility. In any case, we follow the standard practice of 
assuming that (1) gives a good approximation of the true likelihood function, choosing 
coefficients to maximize (1), and then when estimating the variance-covariance matrix of the 
estimators taking into account the possible correlation of different observations from the same 
respondent. We use the Stata® rologit command with the cluster option, which gives a 
heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix adjusted for clusters of correlated 
observations.6  
 Marginal rates of substitution between pairs of attributes are, by the implicit function 
theorem, the negatives of ratios of coefficients in the specification of V. So, for example, for the 
basic specification shown in (1), the marginal willingness to pay for a change in attribute  is 
the ratio 
ka
k c−β β . We use the Krinsky and Robb procedure (1986) to append simulated non-
linear confidence intervals. 
 When estimating the rank-order logit model, we removed from the sample all 
respondents who reported that they were residents of a foreign country, on the grounds that U.S. 
national park policy should reflect primarily American preferences. In another paper we also 
consider two subsamples: respondents who say they have never been to North Cascades National 
Park and never expect to go there—our nonusers group—and the respondents who either have 
been to the park or expect to go there—our users group. If the nonusers have any preferences 
about the park’s management, those preferences must reflect nonuse values. The responses of the 
users will reflect both use and nonuse values. A few respondents did not answer the question 
about whether they had been or planned to go to the park, so we removed those observations as 
well. This left us with 206 respondents and 1,442 sets of rankings.  
 We examine the effect of inconsistency splitting the sample along patterns of 
inconsistency and pooling them to test for differences in parametric estimates and economic 
                                                           
6 Most results are unchanged if the nonrobust (and nonclustered) estimator of the variance‐covariance matrix is 
used, except that standard errors are all smaller. 
outcomes. Recall that we in general expect to see noisier parameter estimates and smaller 
willingness-to-pay values for inconsistent subsamples.  
Table 6 begins by splitting the sample among ever rank-inconsistent respondents, ever 
rank-or-rate-inconsistent respondents, and pages containing a scenario that is ever rank-or-rate-
inconsistent. The page-level estimations enforce a clean separation between inconsistent and 
consistent scenarios and indeed demonstrate a loss of signal in the cultural and wilderness 
preservation attributes. Wald tests on the overall difference in coefficients for inconsistent 
observations are all significant at the 5% level. In general, all cultural and environmental 
attributes have lower estimates, especially the highest level of species protection – 4 species 
protected – which is significantly different for inconsistent respondents in all models at the 1% 
level. The tax attribute is marginally more negative for inconsistent respondents though this 
difference is insignificant in all models. Correspondingly, willingness-to-pay values for a unit 
increase in each cultural and environmental attribute are depressed for inconsistent samples, 
especially on the cultural and species attributes. This is in line with a priori expectation. Also 
note that the status quo intercept is insignificant in all consistent regression samples. 
We next apply the same technique in Table 7 to examine the effects of sequencing 
patterns previously found to be important: round2-failing and fatigue plus rating inconsistency. 
Again we use both respondent- and page-level data recalling that the latter minimizes overlap 
between categories. Round2-failing respondents display only marginal difference in estimates 
and willingness-to-pay values though narrowing the sample to the page-level reveals an overall 
difference significant at the 5% level according to the Wald statistic; however individual 
willingness-to-pay estimates do not display a notable difference. Both fatigued respondents and 
pages, on the other hand, display significantly different estimates at the 1% level. Wilderness and 
species are the only two attributes to show significant differences in willingness-to-pay for unit 
increases in their protection, however, and again fatigued samples are more likely to be 
depressed. Lastly, the status quo displays an interesting duality: it is significantly more negative 
for inconsistent respondents in both categories yet loses its power in pages displaying that 
inconsistency.  
A final round of estimations was done in Table 8 to examine whether the tournament 
design obviated the common problem of difference in estimates and outcomes across ranks, and 
further whether excluding inconsistent samples would help stabilize these differences. This was 
done by transforming the rank-ordered logit model to a series of conditional logit models 
reflecting the top choice against a set of otherwise indifferent scenarios. Note that for the top 
choice estimation consistency failures are now only observed when the winning scenario’s 
ranking changes against the status quo – indeed this transformation eliminates much of the 
observed inconsistency in the survey.  
We find that there does appear to be some gain in achieving across-rank stability 
employing the tournament scheme. Though there is a difference in estimates and outcomes 
across ranks (columns 1 and 2), it is not large economically. Reducing the sample to “clean” 
respondents – those respondents never rank, transitive, nor rate inconsistent – seems to 
exacerbate the differences. Reducing the sample into clean pages, however, appears to narrow 
the differences, especially economically. Throughout the analysis and given the high number of 
ranking sets in the survey, page-level stratification in general appears more appropriate in 
targeting violations of the underlying theory. 
W 
 
 
Conclusions 
 This study employed a novel online tournament-style ranking instrument where 
respondents successively ranked their preferred alternate scenarios until a most-preferred 
scenario was revealed, followed by a ratings task on the top set of scenarios. In doing so we 
hoped to both obviate a number of violations to economic theory in contingent ranking surveys 
found in the literature and test for a range of consistency patterns.  
The test results indicate a rate of consistency failure similar to that found in Foster and 
Mourato (2002). Examining various sequencing effects shows that respondents are relatively 
poor at sustaining consistency for less-preferred scenarios across rounds, and that these failures 
are largely manifested in a drop in preference relative to the status quo. It appears many 
respondents suffered from fatigue and possibly an inability to express indifference between 
scenarios and the status quo (we suggest correcting this in future instances). It is also possible, 
for a preponderance of inconsistent within-round losing scenarios, respondents were 
appropriating downwards their preference for scenarios that were at one point preferred but 
superseded by a better alternative. If true this suggests either (misguided) strategic bias or, more 
likely, noisy or incomplete preferences on the part of inconsistent respondents. 
 Splitting the sample by various consistent subsamples generally yielded lower and 
occasionally noisier parameter estimates for the cultural and environmental attributes, which did 
translate to marginally lower willingness-to-pay values. Despite these differences, the design 
does appear to reduce the disparity in across-rank differences in estimates and economic 
outcomes, and especially when discarding pages containing ever-inconsistent scenarios.  
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